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IN TH.E SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.\HLlEAX \'ICKERS BARRETT
C. BAHH.ETT,
Planitiffs and Respondents,

a11d

\'S.

LELAXD H. VICKERS,
Defendant and Respondent,

Case No.

D. VICKERS and

11787

LTII ELYN VICKERS, his wife,
Defendants,
,J 0

E PII S. BARRE TT and
LTII EL\'. BARRETT, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
X ATERE OF THE CASE
This case involved an action to partition or sell
crrtain real estate in J uah County, l:tah, in which each
d tlw parties has an interest, and for an accounting.

1

1

DISPOSITION IX LO,VER COURT
The Fifth J udical District Court for Juab c
ount•,
Utah, ordered a partitionment and also granted
·
.
in favor of the parties as their respecti,·
mterests appeared.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek to affirm the judgments an1:
order of the District Court granting partitionment :
the property and thus finally terminate the dispute orn
the property which has existed between the parties f,,r
the past 28 years and has been pending before the Court,
over that period of time.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
'Vhile Appellant portrays his version of the fact
it is believed a brief chronological summary by ResponJent will assist in giving the Court a truer perspectiit
of the actual situation.
1

The land in question was purchased from the Stati
of Utah pursuant to the terms of a written contral'
dated July 21, 1938. (Exhibit 1) Shortly thereaften
dispute arise between the parties because some of them
weren't paying their proportionate share of the
Suit was then filed to declare that the defaulting par·
ties had no further interest in the property and to h:w
2

11 1. 111

therefrom. The trial court in that tirst
. 11 t rc1 :dcrcd .i udgme11t in favor of the defendants. The
,N
a ppeak<l and on this appeal this Court rukd
··11 Sqitember 10, l!Hl, in Harrett vs. Yickers, 116
l':.:'d ii-.;. 100 Ctah 5:H, that in spite of the inequality
• 11 paymeuts whieh the parties had made, each of the
i1arl1L·:-. had an undi,·ided one-fourth interest in and to
the
prnperty being purchased.
c 1t·ded

i\t'lcr the remand of that first suit, a seeond suit

;1rn:\·i11g this very same property was conuneneed in
I !q:!. This seeond suit was for for a partitionment or
-:til' :111d diYision of the proceeds and for an accounting .
. \:'it'r the trial, several subsequent hearings were had.
Fi1e years later in 19-H a written memorandum deci,j1n1 \\:ts made denying partitionment. However, for
1 :1 ri(lm and sundry reasons, no findings or judgment
"'' .!1at decision was made and the property was nenr
\(lid.

Thcreaflt.T, and oYer the next thirteen years, further
hi :1r111g;; were had. Finally, on December 21, 1960, the
lnurt 111ade awl entered a decision in the matter saying
m part:

x x x in the light of developments since the

trial of the case it is incquitahle and unfair lo
()rdn a sale of the property. * * "

Ir 1 •\1 t·\ er, 110 partitionment was ordered. That cleci,j(lll 1\ as appealed and on June 5, HHH, this Court ruled
11 Harrett n. \'iekers, 362 P2d 58G, 12 C2d 73, that
\I l 1t. r1,· a co-tenancy 1s no longer desirable and the par1
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ties cannot agree upon a solution, a co-tenant is entitled
as a matter of right, to a partitionment or sale · The cai•
was thereupon reversed and remanded for a new triai
The re-trial or third trial which is the subject matttr
of this appeal was held in September, 1962. No dee::
sion was rendered, however, until almost seven vear,
later. It was finally made and entered on June 21, i9oU.
and is now the subject matter of this appeal.
Although this Court ruled in 1941 that the partiehad merely an undivided one-fourth interest in tht
property, the parties agreed among themselves upon a
working arrangement for the separate use by each n'
them of separate and distinct portions of the residentin1
and cultivatable portions of the property. The District
Court approved this working arrangement and the parties themselves actually occupied and derived the bemfit from the use of the specific portions to which they
were entitled under this arrangement for more than
twenty years.

ARGU1\1ENT
In his brief Appellant sets forth twelve points o!
alleged error purportedly made by the Trial Court
These fall logically into three divisions. Respondent)
will accordingly answer Appellant's arguments by d'.·
recting their arguments to these three divisions of al·
leged error.
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POINT I
THE
JCDG.)IENTS GUAXTED
i'llE P.\HTIES ARE SUPPORTED BY THE.
L\.iUEXCE.
lu Point I of his brief Appellant refers to Appen-,
dix ,\ thereof which is purportedly a recoiciliation of
l·,xhi!Jits A and F setting forth the payments made by
the parties after April 4, 1940, toward the purchase
,1n·t· of the property. It does not show the taxes which
11 tTe paid and by whom. Its main deficiency, howe,·er,
that it doesn't even show all the payments which
\\ere made.

It <loes not give these Respondents any credit for
the:
they paid 4-4-1940, nor for the $138.46
:he:.· paid 5-:n -1939 nor for the $200.00 they paid of
lite
paid 7-12-1938. In other words it fails to
;..;i1 ,. them any credit at all for $483.55 which they ad111it tedly paid toward the purchase price of the property.
Then Appellant's counsel argues in Point II that
Hespondents are not entitled to even the $119.89
11l·t credit which .Judge Hoyt, Judge Day and even
.\ppl·!la11t by his own computation in his own hand" rtt i11g allows them. (See Joseph S. Barrett's hand., ritte11 computation attached to E. J. Skeen's letter
11r' l-l-HHi8 to .Judge Day included with the Exhibits)
'!'ht- reasoning of Appellant's counsel for denying these
lb.;pondl'!lts eYen this $119.89 net credit which was
at by .Jwlge Hoyt by offsetting the debits and
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credits between th<: parties is that it is purportedh
barred from further eonsideration after August l.i.
1948, by the proYisions of 78-12-22 Ctah Co<le A. 11 n0•
tated 1953, as amended, sinee it was inelu<led in Judg,
Hoyt's Decree which was never renewed.
The inconsistency and fallacy of Appellant"s rtasoning is that if these respondents are, by the pro,·isio111
of 78-12-22 Utah Code 1953, as amended, denied tht
net credit of $119.8!) allowed them by Judge Hoyt' 1
Decree of .August 15, 1940, then .Appellant and the
others likewise should be denied the offsetting credib
which they were allowed by the very terms of that sanit
Decree. Respondents then should be giYen additional
credit not only for the $119.89 net credit but for the full
$483.55 which they admittedly paid toward the purchase price of the property. This would in turn reduce
considerably the money judgment which Appellant \\a\
in fact granted against these Respondents.
In Point III Appellant contends the Court erre<l
in making an allowance to Leland H.
for the
work and labor he performed for and on behalf of Appellant as an offset against the money judgment granted .Appellant against the Estate of Leland H.
.
.Appellant coneedes that Leland H. Yickers di<l
perform work and labor for him. In addition the 'franseript bears this out by the testimony of others. Appellant contends, howen.T, tlrnt this work and labor was in
settlement of certain other claims between those two
which were previously settled between them.
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• \11 objedive ananysis of the evidence in this regard
,;1·1110I1strates that the Trial Court acted reasouahlv
11id justitiahly. In any e\·ent, e\-en if the Trial Court d;:1
, rr 111 this respect, it does not justify a reversal but
iillldy an adjustment in the money judgment granted
;i, between those parties.

ill Points I\., \'and YI Appellant complains about
dw Court's acrnuntings ancl particularly about the all( iwances the Court made for the improvements made
, 111 the property.

The fact is that the parties themselves valued the
l':ilire ran('h at somewhere between $8,000 and $H,OOO.
Crnrge C. llarrett valued it at about $8,000. (Tran'cript 81; .Joseph S. llarrett rnlued it between $8,000
a:1d
(Transcript 77, 78) And Ethelyn \'ickers
11(1w Ethlyn \·ickers Johnson valued it even when it
11 ;:., at its best at between $13,000 and $H,OOO. (Tran·nipt :38) X evertheless, the parties were making all
k
of claims for the improvements erected thereon.
These so-called improvements ranged from $0.75 per
l1<ll1r for labor (Transcript 87), $0.50 for a cedar post
,Transcript 87), $1,000 for one house (Transcript
1.
for another house (Transcript a6) and
a;1proxi111ately $3,250 for some spruces, junipers and
:1-,!1 trees planted on the property (Transcript 177).
, \ realistic appraisal of the situation e\·idences
il1:tl some of the so-called improvements benefit all of
i.!Jt· p rope rt y h11 t most benefit only those portions which
the iwli 1·idual parties had hy agreement allocated unto

themsefres an<l ha<l occupied and used for more thau
20 years. The Trial Court's allocation of the sum whid,
it did for permanent improvements erected upon tht
property is certainly substantiated by the evidence.
The answer to Appellant's arguments set forth ii.
Points I through YI of his brief is the phrase used
by this Court in Casey , .. Nelson Brothers Construction Co., 465 P2d, 173 Utah 2d .... , namely:
" x x where there is a dispute in the e,·idenct
we assume that the trial court believed those
pects of the evidenee, and drew the inference\
which could fairlv and reasonablv be drawn therefrom, which tend to support the findings and
judgment; and that upon our views of the record
in that light, if there is a reasonable basis in the
evidence to support them they will not be dis·
turbed."

See also 'Vinger v. Gem State .Mutual of Utah, -H!l
P2d 982, 22 Utah 2d 132.

POINT II
THE RULING FINALLY
BY THE
TRIAL COl_TH.T IS SUPPORTABLE AS \VELL
AS FAIR, JUST AND EQUITABLE AXD
SHOCLD BE
In Point YII Appellant berates the Trial Court
for waiting so long before renclning its decision.
Hespondents wholeheartedly agree with Appellant
this regard. Certainly justice delayed 28 years compb·
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the matter and almost makes a mockery of solalkd justice.
l·;1tt'.,

Since the ruling finally made by the Trial Court
1, supportable and is fair, just and equitable, it should
lie atl'irmed. This Court should put an end to the 28
1 Lar court battle between the parties.

POINT Ill
TILE PROP.EH.TY \VAS A PROPEU SVll.1 ECT FUR PAHTITIOX AXD THE PAHTIACTLTALLY .MADE \VAS XECESSAH Y AS \YELL AS FAIR, JVST AXD
Points Y III through XII in the Brief of Appellant all relate to the alleged error of the Trial Court
:11 partitioning the property and in not allowing the
nioney judgments granetd the respectiH parties to be
<:xprcss and prior liens against the partitioned port10ns thereof.
It is most revealing to note Appellant's changing
positions about the partitiomnent of the property.

As pre,·iously noted herein, primarily because the
partws had in fact agreed upon an acutal working part itilll11ne11t of the property as far back as 194-5, .Judge
in his Decision of December 21, 1960, said:
.. x x in the light of developments since the

trial of the case it is inequitable and unfair to
order a sale of the property."
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..After the conelusion of the present trial which is th
b"
t
su Ject matter of this appeal, J u<lge Day, in his writ
ten .Memorandum Decision of .January 3, 1UU9, Mid
" x x The said property is and should be pa•.
tioned as follows * * *."
·
These Respondents filed objections to the proposed par.
titionment on the grounds that it actually short-changec
some of the parties in equated money values. Apptllant, on February 11, 196!..l, filed his written responst
in which he said among other thiugs that:
" xx x the proposed allocated partitiomuent j,
fair, just and equitable under all circumstance\
of this case. * * * "
This written response of Appellant to the proposed
partitionment was made in spite of the fact that 111,
referees had been appointed as required by the prori·
sions of 78-39-1:! Ctah Code Annotated, 195:3, a•
amended, and which failure Appellant now
i11
error in Point IX.
It was after the re-argument of the case, particularly with reference to the proposed partitionment, that
Judge Day made some minor adjustments in his pn
posed partitionment so as to equalize as nearly as pm·
sible the equated money value for the land partitioned
to the respective parties. Although the Transcript and
Record do not reveal it, the fact is that at the re-argu·
ment to adjust somewhat the partitionment proposed
by Judge Day, .James P. )kCune, now Judge )lcCune:
appeared on behalf of some people Appellant ha 11
1•
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:1µ-reeJ to sell his proposed partitiont'<l half to. lie up.)ta red tor the express purpose of asct'rtaining if the
iJI'()puse<l partitiornnent was satisfactory to the purehay
, r' ut' .\ppellant's portion. This is e\'idenced by the fad
<.a! the name of .James P. :\lcl'une, who dues not
.111J diJ not represent any of the parties in this ease,
Jlt\Trthelcss appears on both the Findings of Fact and
l()11d11sions of Law and the .Judgment and Decree
,1;.n1eJ by Judge Day. They were sent to him at his
npress request.
\\'bile the Ctah Code does proYi<le that in a part1u<11m1e11t proceeding referees should be appointed and
rill'y were not in this case, it is respectfully submitted
that this was not prejudicial. Cnder the circumstances
,,f this ease, eyen if the statutory proYisions with refert·m·e tu the appointment of referees were deemed man.la tnry rather than directory, they could certainly be
:·t>11strncd as haYing been waived by the parties. Furthennore, while the testimony set forth in the Tran"-ri1,t is somewhat confusing, it is respectfully sub;11itted that other than Appellant, each of the other
i'artics testified that partitionment of the property was
Appellant himself said in response to objections
llladt' to the initial proposed partitionment that the
"proposed allocated partitionment is fair, just and equitalilc u11der all circumstances * * *." Thereafter, he e,·en
his partitioned portion.
I 11 answer to the argument that the money judgments granted should have been declared express and
11

prior liens against the property partitioned and :mardtc
to the parties, Hespondents point out merely that thtr·
is no statutory prm·isio11 whieh would authorize this ani:
under the eircumstanees of this case it is not justitiablt

CONCLUSION
From all of the foregoing it is amply dear that tLl
:.?8 year old dispute and legal battle between the
over the property in question should Le termi11altJ ,
once and for all. The partitionment made and th·.
money judgments granted were as fair, just and equitable as can ever be done under the curcumstances of th1,
case; they are supported by an objective and reasonable analysis of the evidence, and, accordingly, shouk '
be affirmed.
Respcetfully submitted,

QlJEXTIN L. R. ALSTON

Attorney for Respondents Arliean Yicker,
Uarrett and George C. Barrett
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